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Cooperative breeding is the joint raising of offspring by two or more individuals, where at 
least one of them is not the genetic parent of the young. The key characteristics of cooperative 
breeding systems are diversity of social behaviours within and between groups and high 
variation of factors influencing conflict over reproduction (for review see Komdeur, 2006). In 
the second half of the 20
th
 century, development of research on cooperative breeding systems 
has been influenced by game theory from human economy (e.g. Nash, 1950; Maynard Smith, 
1982; Hammerstein and Selten, 1994), by empirical studies on different systems (e.g. Brown, 
1987; Taborsky, 1994; Solomon and French, 1997; Koenig and Dickinson, 2004), and by 
mathematical models of fitness advantages of group living in behavioural ecology (initiated 
mainly by Hamilton, 1964 and Vehrencamp, 1983). Cooperative breeding systems comprise a 
subset of social systems with cooperative behaviour, but are of high importance to generate 
hypotheses, search for patterns and mechanisms, and develop theories for the evolution of 
social life. 
 
Mechanistic concepts to explain the evolution of cooperation (see e.g. Dugatkin, 1997; 
Hammerstein, 2003) have been developed parallel to the discoveries of the diversity of these 
behaviours. In this context, evolutionary theory uses mainly game theoretical arguments, 
where the strategy of one individual depends on the strategies of others in the population. 
Most approaches use non-cooperative game theory (for review see McNamara et al., 2006) 
where individuals compete with each other to maximize their fitness but where cooperation is 
not assumed in advance. To solve Darwin’s puzzle of the evolution of cooperation by natural 
selection the Prisoner’s dilemma game (formulated after the Flood-Dresher experiment, 
Flood, 1958), that involves rational players trying to maximize individual payoffs, was 
translated to biology. One reason why this scenario and its variants became very popular in 
behavioural ecology is that its basic from entails just a single, but easily comprehensible, 
cooperative interaction. 
 
Bergmüller et al. (2007) point out that an integration of various approaches from different 
viewpoints is necessary for future research on cooperative behaviour. The authors show that 
local benefits such as group augmentation, tolerance (pay to stay) and social prestige may be 
related to more than one cooperation mechanisms. In my view, mainly five factors influence 
the research dynamics of theoretical and empirical studies on the way towards a cooperation 
theory of cooperative breeding. 
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Definitions 
 
First, system complexity and manifoldness of behavioural phenomena may cause a diverse 
understanding and a variety of definitions used for apparently well known terms (cf. Lehmann 
and Keller, 2006 and commentaries; West et al., 2007). The definition of a behaviour should 
be operational. An individual may act or operate solitarily. Individuals may interact with 
others antagonistically (e.g. fight) or cooperatively. If an individual co-operates with another 
individual, they work together on one or more tasks (cf. also Brosnan and de Waal, 2002). For 
example, cooperative breeders raise offspring together, they share living space and various 
tasks. A cooperative act involves fitness costs and can therefore be viewed as investment. 
When individual A performs a cooperative act by e.g. making a resource available to 
individual B and B cooperates with A by performing the same or a different task the fitness 
consequences in terms of evolution remain unknown. Only knowing the total outcome of a 
cooperative act or of a series of acts enables classification as a certain cooperation 
mechanism, i.e. as an evolutionary mechanism that may favour cooperative behaviour. For 
example, if the result includes benefits for both individuals, reciprocity will be the respective 
mechanism; if individual A was assigned a cost and individual B was assigned a benefit, the 
behaviour of A can be viewed as altruistic, the behaviour of B as selfish and the 
corresponding mechanism would be exploitation or parasitism (see also Bergmüller et al., 
2007). Cooperative behaviour of one individual cannot be viewed in isolation from the 
behaviour of others. Evolutionary persistence of cooperation requires that the resulting total 
fitness consequences include benefits at least for one of the participants. 
 
 
State dependence 
 
Second, evolutionarily stable strategies consist of sets of decision rules. The outcome of a 
single cooperative act may have immediate fitness consequences, but e.g. various stochastic 
or synergistic effects may reduce or increase its influence on lifetime fitness. In a series of 
interactions, cost/benefit relations as well as the availability of alternative options may change 
with time and, more importantly, with individual state. In state variable models of behaviour 
(for review see McNamara et al., 2001) current optimal decisions are determined in relation to 
future fitness expectations and single decision points may have an impact on the path of a 
trajectory. Specific cooperation mechanisms may be important at different times in a decision 
process and their combination may change with state and time. The common currency for 
comparing behavioural alternatives at each decision point is the expected total future number 
of surviving offspring under a specific action, i.e. the individual reproductive value. In time-
delayed interactions the value of the return act cannot be directly compared to the value of the 
current act. To determine the effects of cooperative behaviour on fitness and decide about the 
evolutionary mechanism we have to take account of the different times when young are 
produced (McNamara et al., 2001; Skubic et al., 2004). Decision processes that depend on 
individual state and time provide realistic projections but complexity of cooperative breeding 
systems and methodology so far limited the number of studies using this state-variable 
approach in cooperative breeders. 
 
A cooperative breeding association is often terminated by dispersal of subordinates to breed 
independently as analysed in a study of the population dynamics of cooperatively breeding 
dwarf mongooses (Lucas et al., 1997). This dynamic programming model determines 
equilibrium life history strategies based on age, status and relatedness as states, and with 
population structure and corresponding dispersal decision matrix emerging during the 
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calculation process. The model predicts the age structure in the population, and the proportion 
of subordinates. Future fitness expectations and mortality risk turned out to be very important 
for dispersal decisions of subordinates and variation in intra-group relatedness can generate 
variation in dispersal. 
 
Individuals may cooperate in terms of one type of behaviour (e.g. staying together, helping) 
and operate antagonistically in terms of another (e.g. competing for reproductive 
opportunities) as in an analysis of sequential reproductive decisions of helpers (Skubic et al., 
2004). This dynamic programming model shows the relative influence of life history and 
behavioural variables on the reproductive strategy in the cichlid ‘Princess of Burundi’. The 
model predicts that the optimal strategy of a male helper should primarily depend on an 
increase in expulsion risk resulting from reproducing, on intra-group relatedness and on the 
capacity to sire offspring in a competitive situation with the breeder male. Proceeding from 
this model where breeder behaviour was assumed we have analysed state dependent 
cooperative breeding strategies of both helper and breeder in a dynamic game (Skubic et al., 
MS), where helpers decide about their reproductive strategy and breeders decide about the 
dynamics of their group. This approach allows to predict causes and consequences of 
cooperative breeding under a range of conditions, based on the fitness effects induced by each 
participant’s actions. 
 
Many important dynamic asymmetries in individual characteristics that can be easily covered 
by state dependent models, and asymmetries in the currencies exchanged in behavioural acts 
can be translated to the common currency of individual fitness (McNamara and Houston, 
1986; McNamara et al., 2001). Theoreticians should be encouraged to investigate specific 
cooperative breeding systems, as well as less complex scenarios, involving different types of 
cooperation mechanisms by thinking in terms of state variable dynamics. Probably, the states 
considered will differ between taxonomic groups (e.g. size is mainly important in fish, while 
energy reserves are considered to be of major importance in birds), but the general principles 
will be the same. State dependence may involve several constraints but, given an individual is 
in a certain state at a given time, strategic behaviour will emerge from the decision process as 
a set of behavioural tactics. In terms of the theory of cooperation it is important that 
theoreticians as well as empiricists make clear in their studies, whether they aim at classifying 
the relevant mechanisms in a system, during the life histories of members of a population, or 
according to behaviour in a certain time window of cooperative associations between 
individuals.  
 
 
Population dynamics 
 
Third, behavioural interactions of cooperative breeders may create and influence different 
population structures. For example, in the ‘Princess of Burundi’ there is interdependence 
between individual distributions over body size, relatedness, sex roles and space (Dierkes et 
al., 2005). These structures are dynamic and may again influence behavioural interactions, i.e. 
there is population feedback in addition to social feedback (Skubic in prep.). For example, 
groups with small subordinates will more likely contain individuals that are highly related to 
each other and to one or both breeders. This, together with spatial grouping, will make 
cooperative behaviour towards kin more likely than towards individuals from other groups. 
However, we might also expect high within-group mortality or dispersal rate in a 
metapopulation with groups containing a large proportion of small subordinates. This might 
reflect high competition between adults and high extra-group mortality. 
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Population structure adds another level of complexity to the scheme of cooperation 
mechanisms proposed by Bergmüller et al. (2007). The theory of dynamic systems has mainly 
influenced models of population development in biology (see e.g. Maynard Smith, 1974; 
Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). Some studies focused on dispersal patterns in meta-
populations to predict spatio-temporal variations (Ferrière and Michod, 1996; Ferrière and Le 
Galliard, 2001) and build a bridge from population dynamics to cooperative breeding (Pen 
and Weissing, 2000; Le Galliard et al., 2005). Population feedback on individual behaviour 
may be a mechanism that reduces conflict as shown in a recent model (Rankin, 2006). The 
study reveals that increasing density dependence (increasing strength of population feedback) 
is likely to limit the level of competition, reduce conflict and prevent the population from 
extinction. Game theoretical models including physiological population structure and adaptive 
dynamics (e.g. Metz and Diekmann, 1986) and non-linear feedback effects on population 
densities will be useful to investigate specific social behaviours. A combination of theoretical 
and empirical studies is needed to explain cooperation in specific populations. Discoveries in 
cooperative breeding systems already influenced a theoretical approach of economic decisions 
(see Weibull and Salomonsson, 2006). This model includes population dynamics and rational 
choice and shows that reproductive competition may be necessary to promote cooperation. 
 
 
Dimension 
 
Fourth, it is necessary to consider social behaviour as multi-dimensional (cf. Nonacs, 2000). 
An investment of individual A in individual B could be a response to changing conditions, 
behaviour of other individuals or changing population density. For example, when a female 
capuchin monkey increases the number of cooperative actions towards its offspring (e.g. 
protecting them through defence behaviours) when the alpha-male has been exchanged this 
does not mean that she cooperates more with or invests more in the offspring. Female care 
may be regarded to evolve according to reciprocity (the offspring will contribute to the 
mother’s future fitness) or as by-product being merely a response to the increased mortality 
risk from attacks of the unrelated male. When predation risk is high fast growth resulting in 
quickly decreasing mortality risk is important for vulnerable young. When a female cichlid 
decreases resources provided for its offspring this does not mean a decrease in investment. A 
reduction resulting in lower egg mass may be a response to an increase in helper number 
(Taborsky et al., 2007), i.e. the female invests in having helpers that protect the young. The 
distribution of reproduction between same sex individuals may be controlled by the opposite 
sex (e.g. Magrath and Heinsohn, 2000). For example female control may be important to 
determine male reproductive skew (Cant and Reeve, 2002; Hamilton and Heg, 2007). 
 
 
Complexity 
 
Fifth, the current classification scheme proposed by Bergmüller et al. (2007) has to be 
extended. Direct reciprocity between the same individuals (e.g. individual A cooperates with 
B because B has cooperated with A, Trivers, 1971; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981) may include 
group augmentation (Kokko et al., 2001) when helpers have a positive effect on young 
survival and breeders related to them produce more young in exchange (cf. Skubic et al., MS). 
Cooperation may result from indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987; Nowak and Sigmund, 
1998a, 1998b) if individuals prefer to cooperate with those that have cooperated with others in 
the past (e.g. individual A cooperates with B because A has observed B cooperating with C). 
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Recent experiments demonstrated indirect reciprocity within species in humans (Wedekind 
and Milinski, 2000), and Norway rats (Spahni, 2005), and between species in cleaner fish and 
their clients (Bshary and Grutter, 2006; see also Bshary, 2002). The classification scheme 
proposed by Bergmüller et al. (2007) has not included generalized reciprocity (Rutte, 2004; 
Pfeiffer et al., 2005; Hamilton and Taborsky, 2005), where individuals prefer to cooperate 
with others based on anonymous social experience. In the simplest case individual A 
cooperates with individual B if e.g. individual C had cooperated with A in the past. This 
mechanism does not require specific knowledge about identity or behaviour of cooperation 
partners but may function via changes of hormonal state due to socially influenced 
experiences. The strategy is Markovian since only the outcome of the last encounter (private 
information) is important for the current behavioural decision. The propensity to cooperate is 
increased after positive experience delivered by a helpful act, not by experience of other 
positive effects of the environment (Schmid, 2005). If individual A cooperates with B because 
A has observed C cooperating with D, cooperation evolves via indirect generalized 
reciprocity. These mechanisms of reciprocal cooperation may complement each other or co-
occur in the same system. 
 
Bergmüller et al. (2007) show that concepts formulated in view of cooperative breeding 
systems may be connected to several cooperation mechanisms. They point out that payment 
can be viewed as reciprocity or pseudo-reciprocity. For example, subordinate cichlids may 
use their helping behaviour as “pre-emptive appeasement” to reduce aggression towards them 
(Bergmüller and Taborsky, 2005) and pay to stay and not be expelled from the group 
(Balshine-Earn et al., 1998). A reproductive skew model (Kokko et al., 2002) revealed that 
payment to stay in groups of unrelated individuals may require tight or moderate ecological 
constraints. When constraints are moderate a dominant may require a payment from an 
unrelated subordinate at the slightest fitness costs of the association to the dominant, whereas 
a related subordinate may voluntarily contribute if otherwise its presence would be very costly 
to a dominant. When the dominant would prefer the subordinate to stay it may give staying 
incentives of reproductive concessions or groups fail to form, but then the model predicts no 
payment to stay. Payment to reproduce (Roughgarden, 2004) has been regarded as a form of 
trade of help and access to reproduction and can be viewed to influence why individuals stay 
in a group or help. 
 
Group augmentation and social prestige may apply within and between generations, as well as 
with private and public information. An individual that helps to augment the group may 
cooperate with a breeder that tolerates helper reproduction or with the young produced or 
recruited that will be helpful in the future. Both can be viewed as reciprocity or pseudo-
reciprocity, depending on the sign of the fitness effects. Groups may be able to expand in 
some systems but as larger group size may increase group attraction of predators (e.g. 
Balshine et al., 2001) and intra-group competition (e.g. for shelters, Taborsky, 1985) group 
augmentation may not be possible in some systems or at certain stages of group development. 
Group augmentation can be neither related to reciprocity nor to pseudo-reciprocity. In some 
cases it may remain difficult to distinguish whether cooperation enhancing (positive) or 
decreasing (negative) fitness effects of an individual on a partner will stabilize cooperation. 
 
Social prestige (Zahavi, 1995; Zahavi and Zahavi, 1997) is viewed as a benefit in terms of 
respect gained when individuals stay in their familiar (natal) group and help. A high value of 
prestige does not imply a high social status but may determine the access to high social 
positions and reproductive opportunities in the future. Social prestige was intended to be an 
alternative mechanism to group (multi-level) selection, kin selection and reciprocal altruism 
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(Zahavi, 2003). However, if the individuals that accord respect to the signaller benefit 
themselves from the provided help, the behaviour may be interpreted as a form of reciprocity 
(help is reciprocated by respect of prestige). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The classification scheme presented by Bergmüller et al. (2007) is a first step on the way 
towards a cooperation theory of cooperative breeding. It is important that empirical studies 
measure both, social behaviours and immediate as well as future fitness consequences 
(preferably in long-term studies), and enlighten the development of cooperation mechanisms. 
Reproductive skew models (reviewed in Johnstone, 2000) considered mainly local benefits 
such as increased group output, kin advantages and resource inheritance after social queuing; 
physiological constraints such as differences in fighting ability; ecological constraints on 
future independent breeding; and the social dominance hierarchy to be important for 
subordinates’ reproductive share. It is a theoretical and empirical challenge to search for 
patterns of cooperative behaviours and mechanisms, specifically for their combinations within 
and between systems. For example, kin selection might be important early in ontogeny in 
many cooperative breeders while mechanisms of reciprocity will emerge later, or specifically 
in systems where large or old helpers are found to stay (e.g. Brouwer et al., 2005; Bergmüller 
and Taborsky, 2005; Dierkes et al., 2005). It is important to ask how these systems differ in 
terms of their cooperation mechanisms from others where helpers are recruited from outside 
groups. 
 
The current methodologies available to develop models or analyse empirical data for more 
than two individuals are often time consuming. Therefore, theoretical analyses often make the 
simplifying assumption that an individual is considered to have an average expectation about 
the behaviour of others. However, when an individual cannot measure the contribution of 
another member of the group, this may affect evolutionary stability of group formation 
(Kokko, 2003). Field and lab biologists often record behaviours of several individuals and 
then focus on comparing distributions of behaviour between subsets. Mathematical methods 
such as time series analysis (e.g. Haccou and Meelis, 1994) or social network analyses (e.g. 
Croft et al., 2005; D.B. McDonald, personal communication) may become more important for 
investigating cooperative breeder interactions. It is a challenge for theoreticians to “digest” 
the various characteristics of cooperative breeding systems and develop mathematical 
formulations of the paths and knots between the different cooperation mechanisms, indicated 
in the classification scheme. The tree of cooperation mechanisms proposed by Bergmüller et 
al. (2007) is not sequential in terms of life history or action time, and specific classifications 
may not be mutually exclusive; but it is an interesting approach to capture different influences 
on social behaviour. The main difficulty is faced in relaxing the complexity of the systems to 
make meaningful projections of their biology (cf. Dieckmann and Law, 2000). Empirical and 
theoretical studies as well as the theory of cooperation and the theory of cooperative breeding 
should coevolve. 
 
Where specific factors of cooperative breeding may apply depends on how cooperation 
mechanisms and cooperative behaviour are defined, on the structure and dynamics of the used 
classification scheme, and on the time window of focus. It is the right time to initialize 
discussion and thinking about a new cooperation theory of social systems and cooperative 
breeding is one of its most promising and fascinating phenomena. 
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